The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Reconsidering the Romanovs by Donald J. Raleigh & A. A. Iskenderov

Author:Donald J. Raleigh & A. A. Iskenderov [Raleigh, Donald J. & Iskenderov, A. A.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General, Human Rights
ISBN: 9781317457190
Google: _MzKBgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 28022042
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1996-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

Even more malicious derision was directed against the Prussian-model uniform that Paul I introduced in the army (even the ladies-in-waiting ridiculed it). But Selivanov thought that “the uniforms under Paul were still a great deal more comfortable and convenient than the previous ones. Then the uniforms were broad, spacious, had hems, and were fastened in accordance with the season.”38

When Paul was eleven, Poroshin told him something that proved to be prophetic: “Even with the best of intentions, you will make yourself hated.” A specific manifestation of this hatred was the rumor about Paul’s mental illness, reproduced in many memoirs. Among historians, V.O. Kliuchevskii was first to comment on his madness, followed by P. Morane, M.K. Liubavskii, K.V. Sivkov, and others. The psychologist P.N. Kovalevskii decided that psychologically Paul I was not responsible for his actions. Another professor of psychology, V.F. Chizh, stated just as authoritatively that Paul’s mind was absolutely normal, although he did consider him a madman politically.39

The basic argument in favor of the emperor’s illness involved his policies. Not understanding and not accepting Paul I’s initiatives, his contemporaries, and historians after them, ascribed the emperor’s policies to a mental disorder, while amiably acknowledging his sober intelligence, variety of talents, and so on. M.V. Klochkov analyzed and dismissed as baseless, if not actually falsified, the specific incidents that allegedly certified Paul’s madness. Nevertheless, the gossip about Paul I’s alleged mental illness served as one motive behind the conspiracy that led to his assassination.

Contemporaries explained the assassination of the tsar on 11 March 1801 by reference to Paul I’s policy toward the estates: his violation of the Charter of 1785, his repression of the officer corps, the political instability he created in the country, his erosion of the guarantees of the nobility’s freedoms and privileges, the break that he caused in diplomatic relations with England, and, finally, his inability to rule the empire. Formally, indeed, Paul I’s government had violated articles of the Charter by forbidding provincial noble assemblies and reintroducing corporal punishment. But the latter was applied only under exceptional circumstances involving political crimes, and only after the persons in question were stripped of their title of nobility.

Precedent had been set by the case of the retired warrant officer Rozhkov on 2 February 1797. The Senate submitted a report to the emperor concerning Rozhkov’s “impertinent and corrupting words about the sacred icons and sovereign majesties,” recognized as a crime calling for the death penalty. The death penalty, however, had been abolished by decree in 1754, leaving as punishment the knout, slashing of the nostrils, shackles, and penal servitude. Because Article 15 of the Charter prohibited even this (“corporal punishment shall not apply to noblemen”), the Senate decided to strip Rozhkov of his rank and noble status, place him in irons, and send him to penal servitude. Paul added a resolution: “Inasmuch as he has been stripped of his noble status, neither do privileges apply to him. Proceed accordingly.”40

Corporal punishment was inflicted on Second Lieutenant Fedoseev, Lieutenant Perskii, Ensign Trubnikov, and several other persons.

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